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Having knowledge of the contact network over which
an infection is spreading opens the possibility of
making individualised predictions for the likelihood
of different nodes to become infected. When multiple
infective strains attempt to spread simultaneously we
may further ask which strain, or strains, are most
likely to infect a particular node. In this article we
investigate the heterogeneity in likely outcomes for
different nodes in two models of multi-type epidemic
spreading processes. For models allowing co-infection
we derive message-passing equations whose solution
captures how the likelihood of a given node receiving
a particular infection depends on both the position
of the node in the network and the interaction
between the infection types. For models of competing
epidemics in which co-infection is impossible, a more
complicated analysis leads to the simpler result that
node vulnerability factorises into a contribution from
the network topology and a contribution from the
infection parameters.
1. Introduction
The networks present everywhere in today’s world are
very busy. People travel rapidly across the globe carrying
goods, ideas and diseases; inboxes are constantly
bombarded with work and personal correspondence;
social media facilitates the exchange of diverse ideas.
Thus, when a contagion process of any kind breaks
out it rarely acts in isolation; when ideas spread they
may often inspire innovation, alternatives or opposing
reactions. A curious example is given by trends in diet.
In the United States in 2014 there was a sudden and
massive increase, of up to 686% [1,2], in the consumption
of a variety of alternative grains including Quinoa,
Teff, Amaranth, Freekeh, Spelt and Kamut. This rapid
change in consumer behaviour was driven in a large part
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by activity on social media networks. Crucially, there was a cooperative effect: individuals
who had already received and propagated positive messages about one type of alternative
grain are more likely to do the same for another, making the spread of excitement about these
products inter-reinforcing. Contagious diseases can be similarly complex in their relationships.
For example, the common cold may be attributed to some 200 different viruses and multiple
bacterial infections most common amongst which, the Rhinovirus, is itself comprised of three
different species and some 160 different types [3]. To understand a cold outbreak, one really
needs study a host of different interacting, mutating and competing pathogens. Between-strain
dynamics have a knock-on effect for control strategies. In pneumococcus, for example, the
introduction of a multivalent vaccine has affected the dynamics of other strains [4].
Following its introduction by Kermark and McKendrick [5] in the context of modelling spread
of infectious diseases in humans, the Susceptible–Infected–Recovered (SIR) epidemic model has
been adapted to fit a host of different spreading dynamics, including viruses across computer
networks, ideas through social media, and even traffic flow [6–8]. Furthermore, several multi-type
infection models have also been considered with variants exhibiting cooperation [9], dependence
[10,11] and competition [12].
The above cited works all consider the bulk behaviour of the propagating contagions. Looking
in closer detail, knowledge of the underlying network structure over which a contagion spreads
(see e.g. [13] for an introduction) should enable us to make individualised predictions for the
likely outcomes for particular nodes [14]. Machinery to study heterogeneity in infection models
has been in development for several years. An appreciation of the importance of network
structure in disease spread, unseen by original mean field approaches [15], has inspired the
emergence of network epidemiology [16–18]. One such approach is message passing, also known
as the “cavity method”, introduced in [19,20] for statistical physics models. The idea is to
understand the vulnerability of, or conversely threat posed by, a single individual in the network
by considering similar statistics of those in their immediate neighbourhood. This approach has
been used, for example, by Newman and Karrer in [21] to describe the time development of an
epidemic on a network, and in [14,22,23] to assess the heterogeneous responses of individual
nodes.
In this article we adapt the message passing approach to study the heterogeneous node
responses in a generalised multi-type infection model that may exhibit both cooperative
characteristics and competitive ones. In particular, this enables us to determine a formula for
node vulnerability in terms of the between-type infection probability matrix, T , and show that
large outbreaks may only occur, in both competitive and non-competitive multi-type infection
models, if the maximum eigenvalue of T is greater than the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of
the network’s Hashimoto matrix [24,25]. Furthermore, in the case of competitive infections we
also show that node vulnerability to different infections factorises into a contribution from the
network architecture, and a contribution from the infection dynamics (specifically, the dominant
eigenvector of T ).
We provide examples of our results implemented on both model networks (e.g. Erdős-
Rényi random graphs) and those derived from human social behaviour (e.g. the Epinions social
network). It is important to emphasise, however, that our work is not intended to directly apply
to any particular network or contagion. This is a theoretical study which sheds new light on
interesting possible behaviours of interacting epidemics, and the utility of the message passing
approach in making detailed predictions of likely outcomes. As usual, certain assumptions (such
as the fact that individuals differ only according to their position in the network, and not other
factors) must be made in order to isolate the network-driven effects we are interested in exploring.
Therefore, more detailed data-integrative modelling would required before our insights could be
translated into policy that might seek to intervene in real-world interacting contagions.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. In the next section we introduce a multi-
type infection model with both competitive and non-competitive variants. Beginning with the











infection time on local topology, first when a neighbourhood’s state is known deterministically
and then in distribution in order to recap the formulation of the time dependent message passing
equations as introduced previously by Karrer and Newman. We then move on to generalise
this same approach to considering first non-competitive then competitive multi-type cases.
Finally, a toy example of multi-type infection model where timings play a critical role to node
vulnerabilities is considered. Here it is seen that careful choice of parameters leads to a change
in type prevalence with infection speed; a phenomena however which is dependent upon graph
sparsity.
2. Preliminaries
We present a general model for the spread of an infection with multiple types on a network,
based on the well-known SIR process for simple infections, but with allowance for multiple
different infection dynamics. We shall consider two cases: one allowing co-infection, where a
single individual may be infected by more that one disease type, and another in which infection
with one type excludes infection with any other. Our model is chosen to be as simple as possible,
while retaining the key features (network topology and multi-type infections) that we wish to
investigate. Many complicating features would need to be incorporated if future research on
models of this type is to make actionable predictions about a given real-world contagion, but
this is beyond the scope of the present theoretical investigation.
Our simple disease model is constructed as follows. We work with a static population of
individuals with potential infectious contacts described by some fixed network. With respect to
each of some number of different disease strains (or types), every individual node is in one of
three possible states: susceptible, infected, or recovered. The model evolves in time with each
individual infected with a strain α either recovering from that strain with rate rα, or transmitting
an infection to a neighbour. Importantly, rather than the separate types being treatable as separate
infections, we take a more general approach in which each strain may in principle pass on any
other strain. An individual carrying infection type α will attempt to induce an infection of type β
in a neighbour with rate fβα. Whether or not this infection attempt succeeds is dependent on the
target’s own infection history. We consider two cases: co-infection, and competitive exclusion.
If co-infection is allowed, each individual node may contract multiple strains of the epidemic,
potentially from multiple infected neighbours. In the exclusive case an individual may only be
able to contract a maximum of one infection strain which adds an element of competition to the
model, making it possible for a virulent infection to crowd-out a weaker strain. This creates the
complication that in order to determine whether an individual is infected by a particular strain,
we the need to know not just whether an individual is reached by that infection type, but also
which type reaches them first. This makes it crucial to consider the full time development of the
multi-type epidemic in order to determine the end state.
(a) Message-passing
To analyse the node-dependent outcomes of the multi-type epidemic model introduced above, we
will employ a variant of the message-passing approach formulated by Newman and Karer [21].
Let us begin by recapping here the derivation of the method for the case of a single infection type.
For a single-type infection we may consider the time ti←j at which node j attempts to pass
the infection to i, a quantity which is infinite if either j never receives the infection themselves or
recovers before attempting to pass it on. This quantity is equal to the first time at which one of
j’s other neighbours attempts to pass it the infection, plus an additional time period, Sij , before

















The time until infection of node i can then be deduced by computing the first time at which one
of i’s neighbours attempts to pass on the infection to it, that is,
ti = min
j∈N (i)
[ti←j ] . (2.2)
From these definitions we can formulate equations for the distribution of ti←j . More
specifically, we shall consider the probability, Hi←j(t), that i does not receive the infection from
j before time t. In order to make progress here we shall introduce a sparse tree-like network
approximation. If the graph is tree-like then the probable infection times of i’s neighbours are
approximately independent; using equation (2.2) we compute that the probability i doesn’t





To find an expression for Hi←j(t) we must integrate over the possible values of the delay Sij .
Write p for the density function of the i.i.d random variables Sij . In a single type infection with







 p(s)ds . (2.4)
This expression is substantially simplified in the long-time limit. Taking t→∞, we may use this
system to assess how likely each node is to ever be reached by the infection. To this end, write T =∫∞
0 p(s)ds= f/(f + r) to be the probability that an infected individual will ever attempt to pass
on the infection to a given neighbour. Then we may consider the probability, hi←j =Hi←j(∞),
that j will ever attempt to infect i by taking t→∞ in (2.4) to give





We define the vulnerability of node i, vi, to be the probability it becomes infected eventually. From





To summarise, by first formulating an expression for tij given complete knowledge of the time
progression of j’s neighbourhood, then considering this in probability to find Hij(t) and finally
sending t to infinity to find hij we are able to calculate hi, the probability that i will never be
reached by an infection. This is a powerful method for analysing the node response to epidemics
on networks, the question we now wish to address is how it might be applied to more complex
models.
3. Co-infection
For a co-infecting multi-type model, where a single individual may be able to gain any number of
types, we seek to investigate the heterogeneous node responses for each type, as described by the
probability vαi that individual i becomes infected by some specific strain α at any point during
the outbreak. We refer to this as the vulnerability of node i to strain α.
Our analysis proceeds in a generalisation of the message passing approach. The time at which
a node j will attempt to send the α strain to i will be equal to the minimum times at which any























Note that tαi←j =∞ if no strain that succeeded in infecting j then goes on to pass strain α to i. It
is important to remark here that in writing (3.1) we make the assumption that infection of node
i with a certain strain does not affect the transmission of other types. In the next section we will
consider the effect of complete competitive exclusion (i.e. each node may be infected with at most
one strain); the intermediate case of partial cross-immunity is far more complex.
An approximate form of the complementary cumulative distribution functionHαi←j(t) of t
α
i←j









 pβα(s)ds , (3.2)
where pβα is the density function of Sβα. In writing (3.2) we make the assumption that
contributions to the infection pressure at a given node from strains of different types are
approximately additive. This holds in various circumstances including when t is small, when
the outbreak is near critical, when mutations between types are relatively rare, or when one type
spreads faster than the others. In the long term, the probability hαi←j that i will never be infected




















This quantity defines the chance of a type β individual ever attempting to send a infection α to
a neighbour. We will refer to the matrix of all these values for different α, β as the transmission





To numerically compute node vulnerabilities, it is first necessary to solve the system (3.3). In
doing this it is convenient to examine the network of relationships between variables hαi←j . The
non-backtracking, or Hashimoto, graph of directed edges is defined by the relation that e= (i→










where N (e) refers to neighbours of edges in the Hashimoto graph. Let us write B for the
adjacency matrix of the Hashimoto graph, known as the non-backtracking matrix.
Solutions to the system of equations (3.5) may be found by iteration to give the probabilities
over directed edges which can be used to find the node vulnerabilities, hαi , by equation (3.4). There
is a trivial solution hαe ≡ 1, corresponding to all nodes never receiving any infection. Depending
on the values of Tβα, there may or may not be a non-trivial solution set.
The boundary of the region of parameter space in which a non-trivial solution exists (and
hence where a large-scale outbreak is possible) is known as the percolation threshold, which we




































































Figure 1: Plots showing estimated infection probabilities for three coevolving non-exclusive
infection strains against non-backtracking centrality for nodes on a variety of real networks. In
each plot, the individual node infection probabilities are taken as the mean number of infections
of each type in 1000 simulated runs from random starting nodes. The infection dynamics match
those used in equations (3.10)-(3.12) tuned to be just slightly above the percolation threshold,
with strain 1 shown in blue, strain 2 in red and strain 3 in green. The networks used are (a) a trust
network of 75879 nodes from the Epinions social network [28] (b) a friendship network from the
music streaming service Deezer [29] (c) A network of internal email communication within the
company Enron [30].
















If J has an eigenvalue with real part larger than one, then the dynamical system described by
iteration of the message-passing equations is unstable around the state h = 1, and an outbreak is
possible. According to (3.7), J is the Kronecker product of the matrices B and T . Both of these
have non-negative entries and hence real maximum eigenvalues, say λB and λT , respectively. We
deduce that a multi-type infection defined by transmission matrix T spreading on a network with
non-backtracking matrix B has a non-zero probability to result in a large outbreak if and only if
λTλB > 1. (3.8)
Around the neighbourhood of percolation, the factorisation we find in equation (3.7) implies that
the node vulnerabilities will be proportional to their non-backtracking centrality [27], as expounded
in [22]. Moreover, it may be seen that by augmenting this method to include specific type
vulnerabilities, by way of the matrix T , it may be found that the probability node i becomes
infected by strain α will be proportional to
vαi ∼ ciw
α , (3.9)
where w is the top eigenvector of T and ci the non-backtracking centrality of node i.
This proportionality is demonstrated in Figure 1 on a variety of real world networks for an
infection with three types. For the case that λT is significantly larger than λB the relationship is








































































Figure 2: Vulnerabilities to an infection with three types, computed for two separate nodes in
a real world network of nodes corresponding to 14113 company Facebook pages with edges
representing mutual likes among them [29]. Solid lines show the theoretical prediction of
equations (3.5) and (3.4); circles show the result of simulations averaged over 1000 samples. The
chosen nodes have degree 3 (magenta, lower) and degree 40 (green, higher), and show a strong
differential in outcome.
Example: three types
Let us consider a co-infection model with infection dynamics of the form
fβα = bβmβα , (3.10)
where bβ decribes the overall transmission rate for type β, and mβα the probability of mutation
from type β to type α during transmission (with the rule
∑
γ m
βγ = 1). For simplicity we fix all





Figure, 2 shows example results of such an infection. Here we have used the mutation matrix
m=
 0.8 0.1 0.10.1 0.8 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.8
 , (3.12)
and infection rates b1 = 0.1x, b2 = 0.2x, b3 = x, where x is a parameter we vary in order to achieve
different values of λT for plotting.
4. Exclusive infections
Many contagion processes spread at the expense of excluding others. In our model, if we do not
permit co-infection, then the time at which j attempts to send the α strain to i depends strongly













is the strain infecting j. From here, to calculate Hαi←j(t)
given the equivalent distributions for neighbouring nodes as before, we take the approach of
first calculating how likely any infection is to be transmitted down the edge in question before
then assessing the strain transmitted conditioned on this value.
Take now qαi←j(t) to be the density function for the distribution describing the likelihood of j















Now if we consider the equivalent distribution for j passing on anything to i, with probability





















Now for i to pass on α to j at time t, some other neighbour of j, say k, must pass on an
infection of some given type, say β, at some prior time t− τ and then we must have a successful
α infection from this after the remaining time period τ , this being described by the density pαβ .
To additionally observe exclusivity j must not gain an infection via another node before k, this
happens with probability
∏























Hi←j(s− τ)pαβ(τ)dτds . (4.8)














Now by summing over all the neighbours of j the inner integral here gives the probability that j





















 dτ . (4.11)
We now have a similar expression to (4.1), the equivalent formulation for non-exclusive types, the
difference here being due to the fact that the only infection that i may be infected by is the first to
reach j.
In this way we see the perhaps surprising result that the probability of an individual gaining
a specific type of infection may be broken down into two independent parts describing the
probability of gaining any type of infection together with the probability that the infection if
gained is of a certain type.
This decomposition is useful in computing probability hαi←j that i will never get infected by




























Writing ω for the vector with entries ωα we can deduce the eigenvector equation
Tω = λTω , (4.14)







That is, ω is an eigenvector of the matrix T with eigenvector λT , and we may rearrange (4.15) to
obtain the message-passing equations








Note that the system (4.16) is precisely the same as the well studied case of equation (2.5), with
the substitution T 7→ λT .
We have thus mapped the analysis of the initially more complex exclusive infection model
onto the previous case, allowing one to immediately translate existing results. For example, we
find that the percolation threshold is once again given by the condition λTλB > 1; the same
as for the co-infection case. This result is perhaps to be expected as at the limit of infection
survival each individual will become exposed to at most one infection. This also means that
again, around the neighbourhood of percolation, the node vulnerabilities will be proportional
to their non-backtracking centrality, and equation (3.9) holds similarly to the non-exclusive case–
this relationship demonstrated in Figure 3, with plots comparable to Figure 1.
Example: speed vs reliability
In a contagion with competing strains it may be interesting to know what characteristics will
become dominant. Here we consider a trade-off between the speed and reliability with which
an infection may spread. Both these quantities may be expected to have a bearing on whether
a particular strain becomes dominant in a population. Using our formulated message passing
equations we can then seek to answer the question of what makes for a more successful contagion
type; that which is slow but reliable or fast but unreliable
Consider a model with two competing strains, α and β, with dynamics specified by infection
and mutation rates as presented in equations (3.10)-(3.12). The case we are interested in is when




































































Figure 3: Plots showing estimated infection probabilities for two coevolving non-exclusive
infection strains against non-backtracking centrality for nodes on a variety of real networks.
In each plot, the individual node infection probabilities are taken as the mean number of
infections of each type in 5000 simulated runs from random starting nodes. The infection
dynamics are chosen to be just above the percolation threshold, with strain α shown in blue,
and strain β in red, mutation probabilities mαβ = 0.1, mβα = 0.25 and relative speed bβ/bα = 4.
The networks used are (a) a trust network of 75879 nodes from the Epinions social network [28]
(b) a friendship network from the music streaming service Deezer [29] (c) a network of internal
email communication within the company Enron [30].








The top eigenpair (λT ,ω) of T can be computed directly, then respectively used in equation (4.16)
to compute node vulnerabilities and the overall probability of an outbreak, and in equation (4.17)
to determine which infection type is dominant.
In Figure. 4 we plot the fraction of infections achieved by each strain in an Erdős-Rényi random
graph. The plot shows how this quantity varies as a function of relative speed of infections bβ/bα,
with mutation probabilities are fixed at mαβ = 0.01 and mβα = 0.25, and death rate d= 2. As is
clearly visible from the figure, an infection which reproduces less reliably can come to dominate a
more reliable one, provided it spreads fast enough. This relationship is considered in more detail
in Figure. 5, shows a phase diagram of outcomes (no outbreak, α dominates, β dominates) as both
strain infection rates are varied. In that figure we use mαβ = 0.1 and mβα = 0.33.
5. Conclusion
In this article we have constructed systems of equations capturing the time development of
node states during a complex multi-type infection outbreak, dependent upon the local network
topology. Furthermore, we have shown that this is an effective method for ranking nodes by their
eventual susceptibility to a complex infection outbreak. This makes for a framework to be applied
to evaluate heterogeneity of individual node outcomes in many complex contagion models.
Application of our co-infection model is, for instance, of potential interest in understanding
the dynamics of cooperative contagions. These have been studied for example in [9] to model
phenomena such as the co-epidemic of pneumonia and the 1918 Spanish flu. Alternatively, on
might apply our approach to help understand individual strategy in models for human, Web
based, cooperation as studied in [31]. Meanwhile, the framework for exclusive (i.e. competitive)
contagions may be applied to study individual strain vulnerability in infection models with cross
















Figure 4: Fraction of nodes infected with strain α (blue) or β (red) in theory (lines) compared
to simulations (circles) of an exclusive infection model on an Erdős-Rényi random graph with
N = 1000 and c= 3. Other parameters are: mαβ = 0.01 and mβα = 0.25, d= 2.





Figure 5: Phase diagram showing parameter regions in which there is no outbreak (white), or
where an outbreak occurs and is dominated by either strain α (blue) or β (red). Coloured circles
show the modal result of 100 simulated outbreaks on an Erdős-Rényi random graph with N =
1000 and c= 3. Other parameters are: mαβ = 0.01 and mβα = 0.33, d= 1.
Several promising areas of development for our theory are open to investigation. We have
restricted attention here to models in which (i) recovery times are independent between co-
infecting strains, and (ii) both recovery and infection times are memoryless (i.e. exponential)
random variables specified by a rate parameter. Extensions to our theory that relax both of
these assumptions are possible. Message passing equations can also be formulated for models
of bootstrap percolation [34]. These models correspond to contagions dynamics whereby the
infection may only spread to individuals once they have reached a critical number of infected
neighbours. This concept is relevant for instance in the modeling of opinion dynamics.
What is useful in the potential application of our approach to the models mentioned above,
beyond the existing techniques, is the way in which it is centred on network topology. As we have
observed such information is perhaps most succinctly captured by the non-backtracking matrix
which we are able to employ to great effect. This is worthy of mention as further evidence for the
effectiveness of a powerful tool, only recently introduced into the field of network science, but
already proven highly effective in measuring relevant structural properties, such as percolation











In the course of our approach we potentially also gain much more information about the
dynamics of an outbreak than just the end state. For instance we might see how a node’s infection
probability changes in time. However, in order to assess such quantities directly it would be
desirable to be able to solve systems like (2.4) in an iterative manner similar to that done for
(2.5). Attempting this, one quickly encounters the problem of being able to understand time-lag
between successive infections and how this depends on the network structure. Progress in this
direction would be a valuable step towards providing greater insight into the spread of contagious
processes on networks.
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